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Operationalizing Small Space: Challenges of 
Moving from Research, Development, Test, and 
Evaluation to Operations
Col Burke E. “Ed” Wilson, USAF
Commander, 45th Space Wing and Director Eastern Range 
Patrick AFB, Florida 
Col Jeff Haymond, USAF
Vice Commander, Space Development and Test Wing
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico
Operationally responsive space (ORS) is both an ideal type and an emerging reality.  As an ideal type, ORS 
provides a vision of how space can become more relevant at 
the tactical level of conflict.  ORS is quickly gaining relevance 
to all space activities, and the tenets learned in pursuit of spe-
cific ORS capabilities hold increasing promise for application 
across the space enterprise.  As ORS has matured it provides a 
glimpse into how space systems could be developed, acquired, 
and operated.  For example, the first operational ORS system 
(ORS-1) is being developed now to support an urgent opera-
tional need for US Central Command.  If successful, ORS-1 
will demonstrate an unprecedented way to field “good enough 
to win” space capabilities for the warfighter with aggressive 
cost and schedule mandates. 
Yet as impressive as the ca-
pability may ultimately be, it 
is critically dependent upon 
a broader set of capabilities 
that emerged out of the small 
space research, development, 
test, and evaluation (RDT&E) 
culture at Kirtland AFB, New 
Mexico centered around the 
Space Development and Test 
Wing (SDTW), Air Force Re-
search Laboratory’s Space 
Vehicles Directorate, and the 
ORS Office.  Whether launch-
ing Minotaur rockets, conduct-
ing satellite command and 
control (C2) with the Multi-
Mission Satellite Operations 
Center (MMSOC), pushing 
state-of-the-art plug and play 
technologies, or using scientif-
ic and technical best practices, 
ORS is leveraging a broad ar-
ray of Air Force small space 
capabilities.  Nonetheless, this 
Operationally Responsive Space
dependence has implications, which must be recognized and 
addressed.  Specifically, the RDT&E-derived small space pro-
cesses are instrumental for ORS success in terms of cost and 
schedule.  However, they are not currently operationally robust 
enough to support both a growing ORS portfolio of missions, as 
well as an emergent small space mission area.  This paper will 
defend that thesis, and offer specific suggestions regarding how 
to correct this deficiency. 
Some question whether there is a small space mission area, 
especially given the lack of requirements in the traditional 
sense—no one has tasked the Space and Missile Systems Cen-
ter (SMC) to develop small space capabilities per se.  Instead, 
our legacy RDT&E space enterprise has become increasingly 
relevant operationally, which has led to heightened expecta-
tions.   The ability to package increasingly potent capabilities 
into smaller, less complex (and less costly) systems is pushing 
small space into a new league.  An example from the 1990s 
may be a good analogue.  During the 1990s, after the National 
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) had been officially acknowl-
edged, we openly discussed the differences between Air Force 
Space Command (AFSPC) and NRO as being between “white” 
and “black” space.  However, 
we soon found this distinction 
to artificially define seams, and 
recognition of a new category 
called “gray” space character-
ized space systems that could 
support both “white” and 
“black” space requirements. 
Space-based radar and the 
transformational communica-
tions satellite were examples 
of this gray space.  
A similar parallel seen in 
small space today is the dis-
tinction between designating 
a mission as either “RDT&E” 
or “operational.”  The designa-
tion leads to divergent devel-
opment, acquisition, test and 
operational processes, which 
in general leads to less over-
sight, redundancy, and rigor for 
RDT&E systems.  The allure is 
faster, more cost effective mis-
sion design, development, ac-
quisition and ultimately field-Figure	1.	TacSat-3	launch.
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ing to operations.  As noted, advances in technology are making 
RDT&E systems much more capable—to the extent that com-
batant commands (COCOM) are increasingly interested in the 
capabilities small space can bring to the fight.  Consider just a 
few of the recent or current small space missions.  The Experi-
mental Satellite System-11, known as XSS-11, was launched 
in 2005 as an AFRL experiment to gain insight into proxim-
ity operations.  It was developed using RDT&E processes and 
launched and operated using RDT&E boosters and C2 systems. 
Yet XSS-11 was vital to the development of the emergent space 
control mission area.  Do warfighters today care about the les-
sons learned from XSS-11?  We suspect so, but it was only the 
first in a trend.  TacSat’s 2 and 3 followed, with TacSat-3 pro-
viding hyperspectral imagery to COCOMs.
AFSPC is conducting initial planning to support a transition 
of TacSat-3 to operations after the one-year experiment con-
cludes.  The new Minotaur IV “RDT&E” rocket is preparing 
to launch the Space-Based Space Surveillance System (SBSS) 
and the Hypersonic Technology Vehicle-2A missions.  And of 
course, the first ORS satellite is being developed now.  Deter-
mining the right balance between rapid, agile processes typical-
ly associated with RDT&E system development and the more 
rigorous, yet slower (and costly), traditional processes is a key 
challenge for responsive space missions.
Clearly, the answer to “how much” operations processes can-
not be none; the importance of these missions dictate that we 
have the robustness required to meet warfighter needs.  ORS-1 
was identified as an urgent operational need; the “urgent” des-
ignation requires leveraging the right RDT&E processes, while 
the “operational need” mandates operational rigor and robust-
ness.  The challenge is finding the proper balance across the full 
spectrum of functionality—development, acquisition, testing, 
logistics, training, mission assurance, operational procedures, 
contingency operations, and so forth.  
Consider one segment of the small space enterprise; launch 
systems, which primarily leverages Minotaur rockets devel-
oped in the Rocket Systems Launch Program (RSLP).  RSLP 
was established to oversee safe storage and handling, aging sur-
veillance, and safety of flight for excess intercontinental bal-
listic missile (ICBM) motors and components to support both 
test launch requirements and the operational ICBM fleet (as re-
quired).  Several recent events provide valuable insight.  First, 
a closer look reveals that since the RSLP assets were declared 
excess to operational need in the early 1990s (Minuteman) and 
2000s (Peacekeeper), the assets were dropped from official Air 
Force supply processes.  While this made sense from the per-
spective that no one would be requesting those assets to replace 
depleted inventory, the Air Force lost the ability to positively 
control the inventory of RSLP assets associated with the nu-
clear enterprise—a lesson we have recently relearned across 
the larger Air Force.  We can and must be able to track critical 
assets at all times to include RSLP motors and components. 
Second, the handling of these critical launch assets requires the 
consistent application of technical orders.  General C. Robert 
Kehler challenged the SDTW leadership during their inspec-
tor general outbrief to strictly follow ops procedures with the 
admonition, “you can call it a target, you can call it test, but it’s 
operations!”  Given the necessity to launch safely and success-
fully, this is wise counsel—no matter what the purpose.  Lastly, 
the inability to appropriately resource the system development 
and mission assurance of the Minotaur IV was assessed by 
multiple independent review teams as one of the primary root 
causes for recent launch delays, costing the larger space enter-
prise well in excess of $100 million.  In response, senior Air 
Force leadership has made robusting the small launch capabil-
ity one of SMC’s top priorities for 2010. 
Robusting the small launch capability means we must be 
able to launch Class A payloads if required.  We can see the 
implications of this in figure 2 below.  Using research, develop-
ment, test, and evaluation heritage launch processes with Mi-
notaur 1, AFSPC has a relatively affordable launch capability 
with a high success rate.  With the expanded operational im-
portance of key payloads such as ORS-1 and SBSS, we require 
a more robust operational launch capability such as point 2 in 
figure 2 below.  The intent is to hit the “knee in the curve” for 
the most operational robustness while keeping costs relatively 
affordable.  Once ORS systems have demonstrated their worth 
and we achieve the ORS future state of having many payloads 
available to launch at a quick pace, it may be possible to accept 
significantly more risk to achieve stringent cost and schedule 
goals, such as the future ORS state at point 3 below.
Conversely, as the ORS-1 satellite has experienced cost 
growth, both the AFSPC commander and the secretary of the 
Air Force have pushed hard on wing leadership to meet cost 
and schedule goals.  Meetings with key congressional staffers 
have only reinforced the need to develop capabilities cheaply, 
that are “good enough to win.”  
The fundamental question is whether the “good enough to 
win for RDT&E” with its rapid, agile strategy can be leveraged 
to make the leap to “good enough to win” for the warfighter 
with enough operational rigor to ensure mission success.  These 
messages are in tension, but not in conflict; the importance of 
the mission sets in small space requires the underpinning of 
operational rigor, but we must be able to rapidly deploy these 
Figure	2.	Small	launch	capability,	launch	Class	A	payloads.
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capabilities in a cost effective manner.  While this seemingly is 
the impossible task of “having your cake and eating it too,” this 
tension presents a unique opportunity to reexamine the way we 
acquire and operate space systems.  ORS provides the impetus 
to evaluate every aspect of our acquisition and operational pro-
cesses and develop a new “playbook” that exploits the strengths 
of operational and RDT&E communities.  To overcome the 
weaknesses of the past and build operational robustness into 
the inherently flexible RDT&E processes, we must:
1. Recognize an ounce of prevention is better than a 
pound of cure.  While the cost goals of ORS seem un-
obtainable when built upon an operational foundation, 
the opposite is closer to the truth.  Wise early spending 
to build an operational foundation for ORS will signifi-
cantly reduce downstream costs.  While prescience of 
future ORS needs without firm traditional requirements 
is not a trait highly rewarded by AFSPC programming 
budget drills, it is nevertheless required; and therefore 
will likely have to be driven top down.  We have clearly 
learned from “big space” that lack of resources at the 
initial stages of space system development and acquisi-
tion costs us in spades when we experience mission or 
acquisition failure.  In a recent small space example, the 
ORS-1 satellite build decision was made in July 2008 
with funding contingent on Congressional approval for 
the reprogramming of funds.  Naturally, when delays 
were experienced with the reprogramming, the program 
lost momentum and incurred delays.  When a program 
is intended to deliver a space capability in less than two 
years, it is vital that all aspects of the program are “ready 
to go” at program initiation.1  
2. Identify the processes to apply the “ounce of preven-
tion.”  While ORS has blanket waivers from the JCIDS 
requirements process, some of its supporting architecture 
pieces do not (such as launch and C2).  AFSPC needs 
to deliberately review all small space processes across 
the life cycle to determine where the most bang for the 
buck is in terms of robusting the mission area.  Some will 
require only money but preserve rapid schedule ability 
(i.e., preparing the infrastructure that ORS can leverage) 
such as improved logistics processes, expanded up-front 
launch mission assurance, full acquisition funding at pro-
gram initiation, and so forth.  Other processes may take 
money and time, such as full blue suit operations.  Alter-
native operational constructs should also be assessed, es-
pecially in the area of satellite operations.  With the future 
of satellite operations increasingly migrating from telem-
etry, tracking, and commanding (TT&C)-type operations 
to mission planning, perhaps the national and RDT&E 
model of contractor TT&C with blue-suit mission plan-
ning might be the best approach.  If an existing process is 
not clearly providing value, it should be jettisoned.  For 
example, the program executive officer of space waived 
the requirement to pursue certified earned value manage-
ment reporting for ORS-1, as the very timelines we in-
tend to support are faster than the certification process 
required of this financial data.  Similarly, much program 
office and HQ AFSPC time was squandered trying to 
ascertain exactly which test processes would apply, and 
whether a test and evaluation master plan was required. 
The initial default answer across the major command and 
center functions seems to be that unless told otherwise, 
standard Air Force processes must apply.  We must do 
a focused review on all AFSPC functional processes to 
determine which are absolutely essential to apply to ORS 
missions—with the burden of proof on the functional to 
demonstrate why their process is necessary.
3. Build an ORS sandbox.  Nevertheless, we will undoubt-
edly find that many of the functions needed for big space 
are still required for small space, but they do not neces-
sarily need to be done in the same order.  In fact, many 
must be done in advance to be able to meet the timelines 
required.  For instance, we must have the tasking, process-
ing, exploitation, and dissemination (TPED) architecture 
in place for future versions of ORS-1.  We must have fre-
quency approval pre-approved for space downlinks.  We 
must have satellites that fly on MMSOC.  We must build 
an ORS box that bounds the requirements in advance to 
speed approval; if an ORS mission requirement comes 
through which fits in that box, it is ready to go.  A key 
part of the ORS architecture is defining the standards 
that future responsive space systems must comply with; 
space common data link and MMSOC are only two parts 
of the standard architecture that are coming online now. 
We must continue with plug and play satellite buses and 
payloads.  The tasking system for ORS-1, VMOC, must 
be leveraged for tasking other ORS missions beyond in-
frared imaging.  
4. Leverage the broader space enterprise.  Interestingly, 
the 1990s “gray” space category forced unprecedented 
cooperation between two historically separate space de-
velopment processes (NRO and AFSPC).2  Close col-
laboration between acquisition and operations is likewise 
essential to ensure the up-front integration is successful. 
With the ORS-1 satellite, 1st Space Operations Squadron 
(1 SOPS) operators work closely with both the Space Test 
ORS	 provides	 the	 impetus	 to	 evaluate	 every	 aspect	 of	 our	 acquisition	 and	 operational	
processes	and	develop	a	new	“playbook”	 that	exploits	 the	strengths	of	operational	and	
RDT&E	communities.
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Squadron RDT&E satellite operators, as well as the Re-
sponsive Space Squadron acquisition arm to ensure that 
once on orbit, 1 SOPS will be ready.  The collaboration 
required is not just within AFSPC or even the Air Force; 
we must also successfully integrate our programs with a 
TPED architecture that includes both Army and Navy ca-
pabilities.  This means we need to learn how to test across 
an integrated, joint system.  Our culture must embrace 
being part of a broader mission area; too often each orga-
nization focuses on what they do as “the mission,” to the 
detriment of the broader collaboration needed for small 
space and ORS.  Further, the resource constrained envi-
ronment we face necessitates collaboration since no or-
ganization will have the resources to bring it all together. 
Within the specifics of the acquisition piece, for example, 
we are looking at how to transition from the ORS “jump 
ball” approach of picking a single agency to execute an 
urgent need, to an “all star” team where the Air Force 
may execute the majority of the effort, but will supple-
ment with key external partners for a joint team.  
Small space capabilities and ORS requirements are blurring 
the line between operational and RDT&E satellites.  Small space 
technologies and budget realities will only accelerate this trend. 
ORS-1 is a critical satellite to meet COCOM requirements, but 
perhaps its most important function is to highlight the limita-
tions in our current processes.  By bringing to the forefront the 
functional requirements that drive cost and schedule, we may 
carefully consider the cost/benefit tradeoff of current operation-
al and acquisition processes.  Further, ORS-1 is reliant upon a 
small space architecture that must be robust enough to support 
operational missions.  The ORS Office ultimately hopes to have 
enough capabilities “in the barn” that they can take increased 
risk and avoid the increased robustness that this paper argues 
is necessary, driving down both cost and schedule.  That may 
be the case in some end-state, but that is not the state we find 
ourselves in today and in the near future.  To the extent ORS is 
successful in the near term, it will provide capabilities that are 
few in number but critically important.  In the end, some opera-
tional robustness must be relaxed, and some RDT&E processes 
must be strengthened.  May we have the wisdom to determine 
the right balance.
Notes:
1 All aspects must include ops procedures, logistics processes, defined 
risk acceptance and associated mission assurance, reporting requirements, 
test requirements, etc.
2 Nonetheless, the partnership did not bear fruit with space radar, per-
haps because of the lack of full commitment on both sides to a joint pro-
gram.
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